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Comments
PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF PERSISTENT PROBLEMS
AND RECENT LEGISLATIVE REFORM
I. BACKGROUND
In 1915,1 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a private sector,
no-fault insurance plan2 to compensate the victim of an industrial
accident with a fraction of his working wage so that while he
could not work, his family would not be destitute.8 The employer
paid the compensation and his employe gave up his common law
right to sue in tort.4  The wage fraction was set at 66 2/3% of
the employe's weekly wage and the ceiling on the amount receiv-
able was generous.5 The theory behind the legislation was ap-
pealing to both parties: the employer's accident costs6 were stand-
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, P.L. 736 (1915), as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1066 (Supp. 1971).
2. Noting the trends across the United States toward no-fault auto-
mobile insurance and absolute warranty in defective product situations,
one analyst wrote: "[F]ormerly the little sister of tort law, workmen's
compensation is fast assuming the role of big brother." See Malone, Some
Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation,
16 VAND. L.R. 1039, 1041 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Granville v. Scranton Coal Co., 76 Pa. Super. 335, 341
(1921).
4. Id. at 342.
5. In 1916, a worker's average weekly wage approximated $13.00 and
the average compensation awarded was $10.00. See Mittelman, Workmen's
Compensation Reform: the Prospects for Federal Action, 1970 A.B.A. PRO-
CEEDINGS, Section of Ins., Neg. and Comp. Law 123 (1970); U.S. BUREAU OF
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO
1957 at 94 (1960).
6. "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workmen."
Prosser, TORTS § 82 at 554 (3d ed. 1954).
ardized and the employe's lost time was subsidized. With the
passage of time however, these theoretical advantages were not
strong enough to reconcile inevitable conflicting interests and the
Act became riddled with exceptions and loopholes.7
In February 1972, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a pro-
cedural package designed to reinvigorate the intent of the original
legislation and to close some of the administrative gaps." These
new amendments give the Secretary of Labor and Industry the
power to enforce time standards and to enter into the agreement
system sua sponte.9 Workmen's compensation referees in Pennsyl-
vania are to become members of the civil service system and will
no longer be dependent for their appointments on the legislators. 10
This change was designed to alleviate the backlog of almost 15,000
cases awaiting referees' hearings."
Early in March the reform-minded legislators mandated wide
substantive amendments to the Act so that as of May 1, 1972 the
workmen's compensation posture of Pennsylvania is again in line
with the other progressive industrialized states of the Union.
Among the substantive changes made are the inclusion in the in-
jury coverage formula of workers with pre-existing disabilities, 12
the extention of payments in cases of permanent partial disabil-
ity,'3 the creation of a subsequent injury fund,14 the elimination
of the accident requirement," and the correlation of the compen-
sation ceiling with the statewide average weekly wage.16 These
amendments are particularly significant in view of a national
7. Typical are numerical exceptions, low ceilings, time limits on med-
ical payments and exceptions to injury coverage formula. The most in-
equitable aspect of the exceptions is that the workmen themselves do not
realize that coverage is limited by certain conditions. Justice Cardozo
wrote: "[A] policy of insurance is not accepted with the thought that its
coverage be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules." Silverstein v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 83, 171 N.E. 914, 915 (1930).
8. 2 PA. BULL. 243-50 (Feb. 19, 1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§§ 1 et seq. (Supp. 1971). [The PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN is the latest official
compilation available of S.B. 902, 156th Sess. at the time of this writing.
When the noted section amends the existing codification, the appropriate
sections in PA. STAT. ANN. will be indicated].
9. 2 PA. BULL. 249 (Feb. 19, 1972).
10. 2 PA. BULL. 251 (Feb. 19, 1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 741.3 (Supp. 1971).
11. See Testimony of The Secretary of the Pa. Dep't of Labor and
Industry before the Nat'l Comm'n on State Workmen's Compensation Laws,
Wash. D.C., Dec. 13, 1971 (Pa. Dep't. of Labor and Ind. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY]; for the public reaction to the move
see Harrisburg Evening News, Compensation Vote Called Blow to Patronage,
Feb. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
12. S.B. 1048, § 301(c), 156th Sess. (1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 411 (Supp. 1971).
13. S.B. 1048, § 306(c), 156th Sess. (1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 512 (Supp. 1971).
14. S.B. 1048, § 306.2, 156th Sess. (1972).
15. Id. § 301(a) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Supp. 1971).
16. Id. § 105.2 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 25 (1952).
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movement to federalize the states' workmen's compensation sys-
tems.17 Discrepancies and inequities in coverage formulae and in
benefit levels among the several states have attracted proposals
at the national level which would force the states to comply with
minimum federal standards.' 8 As a result, those who are inter-
ested in streamlining and improving their state compensation sys-
tems must look not only to their neighbors, but also to the federal
workmen's compensation schemes for standards against which to
measure progress.
It is the purpose of this Comment to outline the problems
which led to the recent legislation in Pennsylvania and to analyze
the new amendments as solutions to those problems in the context
of recent court decisions.
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S PROBLEMS: LATE PAYMENTS
AND THE "SERBONIAN BOG."
A. Payments Too Late
Pennsylvania has not been able to achieve the workmen's com-
pensation system envisioned by the legislators of 1915.19 A study
of the system during the administration of Governor Gifford
Pinchot concluded:
The objective of sound administration in the interest
of the injured workman is still a distant goal .... Set
over against the ideal of speedy and inexpensive settle-
ment of disputed claims are the facts of long delays in
most cases, of decreased benefits because of attorneys'
fees, and the failure of the referees to award interest in
many cases.
20
In 1971, thirty-seven years later, the candid appraisal of the newly
appointed Secretary of Labor and Industry indicated continuing
failure:
[I]t was painfully apparent to us that the program
was seriously deficient. It is a bureaucratic, administra-
tive mess subjecting those unfortunate enough to need
17. Recent federal enactments directly affecting states' workmen's
compensation include: The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-78 (Supp. 1972); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1970).
18. H.R. 6780, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). On Feb. 17, 1969 Rep.
Carl D. Perkins (D. Ky.) filed a bill which would require all employers
engaged in interstate commerce to pay workmen's compensation benefits
equal to that provided in Longshoremen's Act. (See note 17 supra.)
19. See TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY, note 11 supra at 1.
20. Id.
its services to shameful treatment. I seriously doubt that
there is any [other] program in which state government
is involved that is in such deplorable condition. 21
A principle reason for this lack of progress was the structural
organization of the workmen's compensation agency of the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry.2 2 The Director of the system headed
the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation which acted merely as
a secretarial pool and correspondence repository. 2a The role the
Bureau was assigned in the actual compensation process was small.
For fifty-six years the Bureau was cast in the role of a grade
school teacher, checking the arithmetic on the compensation agree-
ments and correcting the figures if they did not correspond to ac-
ceptable minimums. If a dissatisfied claimant petitioned the Bu-
reau for redress or an explanation, the Bureau was limited to send-
ing the claimant an apologetic letter and forwarding the petition
to a referee of the Workmen's Compensation Board for settle-
ment. 24 The Department, through its Bureau, had no privilege
to enter into the agreement procedure upon petition or sua sponte.
Thus the Bureau's function remained primarily that of providing
typists and filing cabinets for the Workmen's Compensation Board
and its referees.
Under the Administrative Code of 1929, the Workmen's Com-
pensation Board, composed of three gubernatorial appointees, is
the primary functional unit of the system.2 5 This Board assigns
cases to the various referees and hears appeals from referees' de-
cisions. The powers and duties of the Board are exercised inde-
pendently of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation.2 6 The ref-
erees are the initial screening and decision-making units of the
Pennsylvania agreement system. Although the 1929 Administra-
tive Code designated the referees as departmental administrative
bodies, in practice they are remote from the Department of Labor
and take their assignments from the Board.
27
The original theory behind restricting the Bureau's role was
that its influence should be excluded from the personal meeting
of the minds between employer and injured employe. Under the
agreement system, the self-insuring employers, the private insur-
ance carriers, and the State Workmen's Insurance Fund handled
all of the details of the compensation process until a dispute arose
21. Id.
22. See Administrative Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 568
(1962).
23. Id. § 568(a). Interview with Richard H. Wagner, Director of
Pennsylvania Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, in Harrisburg, Feb. 4,
1972.
24. See Administrative Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 568(f)
(1962).
25. Id. §§ 151, 572.
26. Id. § 568.
27. Id. §§ 573, 152; See Downing v. Leechburg Mining Co., 195 Pa.
Super. 574, 578, 171 A.2d 857, 859 (1961).
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which necessitated a referee. Critics have cited the economic dis-
parity between the interested parties and have concluded that
under such a coercive system an employe will only elect to fight
the insurer's offer under unusual circumstances.2 8 Other states
have renounced the agreement system as not placing enough em-
phasis on timely payment.
29
Pennsylvania experience indicates that when compensation
has been paid pursuant to an agreement between the injured em-
ploye and his employer, it has not been timely. 0 Under the re-
quirements which were in effect prior to 1972, the employer and
the employe had an indefinite time within which to come to an
agreement concerning compensation after the initial seven-day
waiting period.31 Within thirty days after the agreement, the par-
ties were required to deliver the document to the Bureau for
arithmetic check and approval. 32 The Bureau had thirty days after
receipt to return the approved agreement to the parties, at which
time compensation was payable.3 3 The employer was not in de-
fault until thirty days after the receipt of the approved agree-
ment.3 4 A Bureau survey of cases settled during the first six
months of 1971 documents the results of this "ninety day maxi-
mum upon an indefinite period" system:
[I]t is perhaps pertinent to note that in more than
two-thirds (68%) of all cases surveyed, the compensation
agreements were not reached until after the employe had
returned to work. . . . In more than one-quarter (28%)
of all cases, the compensation agreements were not reached
until more than one month after the employe had re-
turned to work.
76% of all compensation agreements received during
28. See DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No. 87, COMMISSIONER, WISCONSIN IN-
DUSTRIAL BOARD 129 (1947).
29. Id. at 130.
30. 71% of the cases studied in the first six months of 1971 in Penn-
sylvania indicated a time lapse of one month or more between the injury
and the compensation agreement. See Statement of the Dir. of Workmen's
Compensation, Pa. Dep't. of Labor and Industry to the Nat'l Comm'n on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, Sept. 22, 1971. (Pa. Dep't of La-
bor and Ind. 1971) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR].
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 731 (1952). "Most states . . . have a
waiting period ranging from one to seven days, allegedly either (1) to re-
duce the cost of investigating as well as deciding cases involving minor
injuries, or (2) to prevent malingering for a few days in order to collect
compensation." S. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAWS 261 (1944).
32. Id. § 733.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 921.
the sampling period were within the one month limit.
[i.e. 24% of the cases showed that the employers did not
forward the agreement to the Bureau within thirty days.]
[Only] 7% of the compensation agreements received
during the sampling period were 'approved' and sent back
within the statutory one month time lapseA5
These figures represent the agreement system in operation in
1971. In contested cases, where no agreement was reached by the
parties, the time delays until final adjudication were much long-
er.3 6 Two statutes of limitation applied. One was the 120 day
notice period to the employer of the occurrence of the accident 37
and the second was the sixteen month filing period for the em-
ploye's claim petition.38 The answer was due from the employer
or his insurer within twenty days after receipt of the petition.
As soon as possible thereafter the Board would set the time and
place for the hearing. Hearings were to be within ninety days
after the initial filing of the petition. 9 The backlog of cases
awaiting referee's hearings in Pennsylvania was estimated by the
Secretary of Labor and Industry to be 14,026 as of December 1,
1971.40 Though the delay had been partially attributed to extra-
system factors such as the parties' tactical strategy,4 1 the medical
experts' rigid time schedules, and the attorneys' low profit margin,
the Secretary testified that a primary cause of the backlog was
limited time devoted to hearing cases:
Starting with records on the days on which hearings
were scheduled and taking into consideration what we
have been able to understand about cancellations, post-
ponements and withdrawals, as well as the character of
the cases heard, we concluded that: 4 of the referees
worked less than 50 days in the 12 month period, 24
worked less than 100 days, and only one referee worked
as much as 130 days.
42
The Secretary attributed the "deplorable situation" to erratic su-
pervision and the static low salary of $10,500. He continued:
Now all but one of the referees are lawyers and,
35. See STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR, note 30 supra.
36. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969)
(deceased's accident occurred Feb. 9, 1962); Bussone v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 210 Pa. Super. 442, 234 A.2d 195 (1967) (claimant's heart attack occurred
Sept. 6, 1963); S.W.I.F. v. Young, 2 Cmwlth. Ct. 423, 276 A.2d 552 (1971)
("There is absolutely no explanation anywhere in the record of this case
why the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County did not act on this
appeal until Oct. 9, 1970, more than eight years after the appeal was filed.")
Id. at 426, 276 A.2d at 554.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 631, 632, 633 (1952).
38. Id. § 602.
39. Id. § 802.
40. See TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY, note 11, supra at 3.
41. Berkowitz, The Processing of Workmen's Compensation Cases, LA-
BOR DaP'T BULL. 310 at 105 (1967).
42. TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY, note 11, supra at 3.
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not surprisingly, they have law practices, which in most
case[s] have a primary call of their time, concern and
energy.
Unquestionably, this absurdly low salary for a job of
such importance tends to serve as a justification for the
assumption that they should not be required to work
full time as referees. I concede that this justification is
not without some validity.
43
He further contended that the gubernatorial appointment requir-
ing a two-thirds mandate of the Senate tends to keep referees fro-
zen into their positions "regardless of their degree of compe-
tence.,
44
The pattern of appeals from the Board into the court system
of the Commonwealth was another contributing source of delay
and in the normal case no payment was made to the disabled em-
ploye pending appeal.45 Even more vexatious than the delay be-
fore the first payment was the termination of the compensation
without notice to the employe by the employer's filing of a peti-
tion to modify the award:
The filing of a petition to terminate or modify a
compensation agreement or award . . . shall operate as a
supersedas, and shall suspend the payment of compen-
sation fixed in the agreement or by the award, in whole
or to such extent as the facts alleged in the petition would,
if proved, require.
4 6
Deprivation of compensation without a hearing was held to be con-
trary to the basic purposes behind the federal Unemployment
Compensation Act by the Supreme Court in California Department
of Human Resources Development v. Java.47 The similarity be-
tween the Java facts and the typical situation under the workmen's
compensation supersedas provisions is remarkable. 4
B. Substantive Limits and The Serbonian Bog49
Critics of states' compensation systems have cited low ceilings
on the maximum compensation payable as evidence of the em-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 4.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 971 (1952).
46. Id. § 774.
47. 91 S. Ct. 1347 (1971). "It would frustrate one of the Act's basic
purposes-providing a 'substitute' for wages-to permit an employer to ig-
nore the initial interview or fail to assert and document a claimed defense,
and then effectuate cessation of payments by asserting a defense to the
claim by way of appeal." Id. at 1355.
48. See TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY, note 11 supra at App. D.
49. See Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934);
ployer's receiving immunity from suit without paying adequate
benefits in return. 0 The ceiling compensation rate in Pennsyl-
vania in January, 1972 was $60.00 per week for a totally disabled
worker, while the ceiling on permanent partial injury was $45.00
per week. 51 The $60.00 maximum represented a compensation loss
to the average production worker in Pennsylvania in 1969 of $25.01
per week.12 In 1970 he lost $27.81 per week of compensation when
he was totally disabled.5 3 Despite the tax exemption 54 the average
production worker who, in 1970, was earning $131.71 a week would
not get 66 2/3% of his average weekly wage because of the pegged
ceiling.
Pennsylvania's time limit on medical coverage for the injured
worker has resulted in complete inequity to the employe as ex-
emplified by the facts and the holding of Krivosh v. City of Sha-
ron.5 5 Claimant was a police officer who fell and injured his back
while on duty on December 27, 1960. Under the medical limit at
that time he was entitled to medical coverage for six months after
the disability began.56 Despite the continuous and increasing pain
in his lower back, Krivosh was able to continue working until
July 30, 1971. He had taken only three days sick leave since the
accident. He underwent surgery the last day of July and was
totally disabled for two months. Denying claimant's petition for
coverage of his medical expenses, the Superior Court held that
the statute covered only those medical bills accrued during the six
month period following his disability.5 7 Since he had taken Jan-
uary 23, 1961 as his first sick day following the accident, he was
covered medically only until July 23, 1961.58 Though the law was
amended after this case to extend medical coverage to twelve
months, limits on the period of medical compensability in state
compensation laws continue to provide ammunition for its critics.59
The provision in the original Pennsylvania Act that the Board may
upon petition approve medical expenditures beyond the twelve
Justice Cardozo wrote: "The attempted distinction between accidental re-
sults and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a
Serbonian bog." Id. at 499.
50. Johnson, Can Our State Workmen's Compensation System Sur-
vive? 3 FORUM 265, 269 (1968).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511, 512 (Supp. 1971).
52. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1971 at 227 (92d ed. 1971) (Table 357 indicates that the average
gross weekly earnings for production workers in Pennsylvania was $127.52
in 1969 and $131.70 in 1970).
53. Id.
54. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 104(a) (1).
55. 205 Pa. Super. 498, 211 A.2d 109 (1965).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531 (1961).
57. Krivosh v. City of Sharon, 205 Pa. Super. 498, 504, 211 A.2d 109,
113 (1965).
58. Id.
59. See O'Brien, More Injuries, Less Compensation, Reprinted from
AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST (Feb. 1970).
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month limit was qualified by the stipulations that notice to the
Board must be prior to the incurrence of the expense and that the
treatment must restore the disabled workman's earning power to
a substantial degree.60 The substantial degree requirement obvi-
ates long term rehabilitation programs for the totally disabled
who need it the most. Professor Berkowitz' summary indicates
the position taken by more progressive states:
Within the workmen's compensation framework, re-
habilitation can be thought of as a set of services de-
signed to restore the injured worker to a job, or, if this
is not possible, to his maximum level of physical well
being.6 '
Restrictions on medical coverage and ceilings on compensation
payable were problems created almost exclusively by the legisla-
ture, but from the point of view of the practicing bar the most
significant obstruction to the proper operation of Pennsylvania
workmen's compensation has been largely judge-made. This is the
"Serbonian bog" of workmen's compensation-the requirement
that the workman show that his injury was caused "by an acci-
dent. '62  If the disabled employe could not show "injury by an
accident," he did not sustain a compensable injury in Pennsyl-
vania.63 As medical science developed and as injuries became
more subtly related to the work environment, Pennsylvania
claimants were thwarted in their suits because of the conceptual
cellblock built around causation by the accident precedent.6 4 Prov-
ing causation between the employment and the injury in terms of
accident developed into a legal charade, the outcome of which de-
fied predictability.65 Claimant's attorneys could not with confi-
dence assure their clients of success or even probable success.
The accident requirement put a premium on sharp pleading, i.e.,
it became necessary to plead a slip or a twist when perhaps those
words would not have been in the employe's initial description of
his accident. The purpose of the accident requirement was to
limit the number of compensable injuries,06 a purpose not in con-
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531 (Supp. 1971).
61. See Berkowitz, The Processing of Workmen's Compensation Cases,
DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. 310 at 166 (1967).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Supp. 1971). See note 49 supra.
63. See, e.g., Hilt v. Roslyn Vol. Fire Co., 445 Pa. 133, 281 A.2d 873
(1971); Anderson v. King Kup Candies, Inc., 3 Cmwlth. Ct. 227, 281 A.2d
369 (1971); Rettew v. Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. 564, 165 A.2d 424 (1960).
64. See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 236 A.2d 819
(1967) (dissenting opinion, Hoffman, J.).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Lacey v. Washburn and Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 578,
164 A. 724, 725 (1933) (act has limited liability to a fraction of that in-
formity with the avowed intent of the original Pennsylvania work-
men's compensation statute.
67
The workmen's compensation enabling legislation which was
passed as an amendment to Article III, Section XXII of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution 6s did not mention the word "accident":
The general assembly may enact laws requiring the
payment by employers, or employers and employes joint-
ly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes
arising in the course of their employment .... 69
The legislature did insert "by an accident" into the recovery for-
mula of Section 301 (a) and this modifying phrase became a principle
source of unpredictability in the Act:
When employer and employe shall by agreement,
accept the provisions of article three of this act, compen-
sation for personal injury to, or for the death of such
employe, by an accident in the course of his employ-
ment, shall be paid in all cases by the employer.
70
Section 301 (c) defined the term "injury by an accident":
The term 'injury by an accident in the course of his
employment,' as used in this article, shall not include an
injury caused by an act of a third person intended to
injure the employe because of reasons personal to him,
and not directed against him as an employe or because
of his employment; but shall include all other injuries
sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the
furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer,
whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere .... 71
Despite the statutory definition, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court conceptualized its own definition of a compensable injury
in Lacey v. Washburn and Williams Co. 72  The Lacey decision
stands for seventeen years of Pennsylvania decisions in which the
claimant was the loser because he could not prove that he was in-
jured under conditions which fit the court's definition of "by an
accident." Employed by the defendant as a carpenter, Lacey died
of pneumonia after he had spent about an hour taking measure-
ments for shelving in defendant's refrigerating room where the
temperature was between 10 and 20 degrees below zero. Confin-
finite number). Rettew v. Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. 564, 569, 165 A.2d 424,
427 (1960) (death merely hastened by the work in which the employe
has been regularly engaged cannot be treated as accidental).
67. See, e.g., Carpinelli v. Penn Steel Castings Co., 209 Pa. Super. 390,
394, 227 A.2d 912, 914 (1967) (law should be construed liberally and in-
terpretations resolved in favor of those it intended to benefit); Allen v.
Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 286, 291, 119 A.2d 832, 835
(1956) (technicalities are not looked upon with favor in compensation
cases).
68. Now PA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 18 (1968).
69. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18 (1968).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Supp. 1971).
71. Id. § 411 (emphasis added).
72. 309 Pa. 574, 577, 164 A. 724, 725 (1933).
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ing itself to the single issue of whether Lacey's death was "by an
accident" the court reasoned:
The word accident-as used in the act-must be in-
terpreted in its usual, ordinary, popular sense ....
Death is brought about in a number of ways. Our
Workmen's Compensation Act has limited liability to a
fraction of that infinite number .... That which dis-
tinguishes an accident from other events is the element
of being unforeseen; an accident is an occurrence which
proceeds from an unknown cause, or which is an unusual
effect of a known cause, and hence unexpected and un-
foreseen. The death of an employe, unless it is the re-
sult of some untoward happening, not expected or de-
signed, a mishap or fortuitous happening, aside from the
usual course of events, is not compensable under our stat-
ute.
From what has been said, we think it can readily be
understood that the exposure which caused the death in
the instant case was not an accident-as that word is
used in our Compensation Act .... Quite the contrary,
it was the natural and usual consequence of his entering
and remaining so long in such a place.
73
To further illustrate the concept of accidental cause as a cri-
terion of a compensable injury the Lacey court distinguished two
coal mine cases. In Boyle v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and
Iron Co.74 a miner's widow was awarded compensation for his
death by pneumonia which was caused by a soaking he received due
to the presence of unusually large quantities of water in the mine.
In Micale v. Light75 a miner's widow was denied compensation for
her husband's death caused by a chill he received while working
in a wet place in a mine for more than a month. Such factual
distinctions are almost ludicrous and appear to fly in the face of at
least one purpose of the act which was to do away with assump-
tion of risk and other common-law employer defenses.76 In 1903
the English courts rejected what was to become the narrow con-
struction of the accident requirement adopted by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Lacey when Lord MacNaghten wrote:
It does seem to me extraordinary that any body should
suppose that when the advantage of insurance against ac-
73. Id. at 577-81, 164 A. at 725-26.
74. 99 Pa. Super. 178 (1930).
75. 105 Pa. Super. 399, 166 A. 600 (1932).
76. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 41 (1952); see generally, Horovitz,
Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LAW
Soc'y J. 466 et seq. Boston, Mass. (1947) (discusses growth of the theory of
compensation and specific employer common law defenses).
cident at their employers' expense was being conferred
on workmen, Parliament could have intended to exclude
from the benefit of the Act some injuries ordinarily des-
cribed as "accidents" which beyond all others merit favor-
able consideration in the interest of the workmen and em-
ployers alike . .. A man injures himself suddenly and un-
expectedly by throwing all his might and all his strength
and all his energy into his work by doing his very best and
utmost for his employer, not sparing himself or taking
thought of what may come upon him, and then he is to be
told that his case is outside the Act because he exerted him-
self deliberately, and there was an entire lack of the fortui-
tious element!
77
To avoid the result reached in Lacey, but keeping the em-
phasis on the word "accident," later Pennsylvania courts developed
an extension to the Lacey concept of accidental cause entitled the
"unusual pathological result doctrine."7 The unusual pathological
result doctrine reflected Lord MacNaghten's reasoning that work-
men's compensation should compensate the healthy employe for
his injury if the result of the injury-producing event was path-
ologically unusual, i.e. "accidental." In such a case the accident
was held to reside in the extraordinary effect rather than in the
cause.7 9 Workmen with a pre-existing disease or weakness were
excluded from recovery under the unusual pathological result doc-
trine; they were required to show a mishap, a tear, or a sudden
impact to recover compensation. 0 The courts were unwilling to
compensate all accidental injuries under the Act and in fact were
compelled to admit that "accident" for purpose of workmen's com-
pensation no longer meant "accident" as the layman understands
that term.8 ' As the efforts of the courts were directed at the
proper construction of the accident requirement, Pennsylvania
workmen's compensation jurisprudence became enmeshed in terms
like "fortuitous," "usual," "unusual exertion," and "materially
greater exertion.S 2 As a result of this "Serbonian bog" of mean-
ingless phraseology the Pennsylvania Superior Court in York v.
State Workmen's Insurance Fund8 3 concluded in massive under-
77. Fenton v. J. Thorley Co., A.C. 443, 448 (1903).
78. See, e.g., Corbeil v. A. & P. Stores, 213 Pa. Super. 1, 245 A.2d 864
(1968); Wance v. Gettig Eng'r and Mfg. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 297, 204 A.2d
492 (1964).
79. See, e.g., Barber v. Fleming Raugh, 208 Pa. Super. 230, 237, 222
A.2d 423, 427 (1966).
80. See, e.g., Billick v. Republic Steel Corp., 214 Pa. Super. 267, 257
A.2d 589 (1969); Lingle v. Lingle Coal Co., 203 Pa. Super. 464, 201 A.2d
279 (1964).
81. See Gammaitoni v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 185 Pa. Super. 643,
645, 139 A.2d 679, 681 (1958).
82. See, e.g., S.W.I.F. v. Young, 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 423, 276 A.2d 552 (1971);
Scanella v. Salerno Importing Co., 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 11, 275 A.2d 907 (1971);
Mapp v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. Super. 101, 257 A.2d 306 (1969);
Gaughan v. Commonwealth of Pa. State Police, 208 Pa. Super. 406, 222 A.2d
446 (1966); Litman v. Litman, 185 Pa. Super. 69, 137 A.2d 918 (1958).
83. 131 Pa. Super. 496, 200 A. 230 (1938).
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statement that "those [accidents] that are compensable and those
that are not compensable are divided by a line which at times ap-
pears indistinct." s
The irony of the Pennsylvania situation was that it was the
compassion and sympathetic interpretation of the purpose behind
the act which produced the tangled web to recovery. 5 The courts
did not feel that they could judicially eliminate the accident re-
quirement so they made inroads and exceptions on an individual
case basis which allowed recovery in the instant case but created
greater problems as the application of the accident requirement
became extremely unpredictable.8 6 A short synopsis of some re-
cent court decisions puts some perspective into the depth of this
problem.
In Barber v. Fleming Raugh8 7 the superior court found that
although claimant was employed as a manual laborer for de-
fendant roofing contractor for seventeen months prior to the acci-
dent, his exertion in lifting a roll of roofing tar paper was a sub-
stantial deviation from his usual duties.88 The claimant testified
that usually someone helped him lift the 150 to 175 pound rolls
and that when he lifted the one that caused his accident by him-
self, he heard his back pop. Though previously healthy, the claim-
ant was totally disabled after his accident.8 9 Six years after his
injury the claimant's case was finally decided in his favor under
the mishap theory developed in Lacey because the court was able
to find sufficient unusual exertion to satisfy the accident require-
ment.
In Findon v. Nick Chevrolet Co.,90 the claimant was perform-
ing a regular part of his work in defendant's garage, when, as he
84. Id. at 498, 200 A. at 231 (1938).
85. See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 461, 236 A.2d 819,
826 (1967).
86. Ford, Workers' Compensation-Injury by Accident, 4 RES. JUDICA-
TAE 160 (1950).
This is one branch of the law where certainty is desirable, because
the claimants are usually persons without the means to risk com-
paratively large sums for the determination of doubtful cases, and
to endure long delays whilst attempts are made to solve the prob-
lems posed by the words 'injury by accident.' From the point of
view of employers and their insurers, certainty is no less desir-
able. It is not a question of sacrificing flexibility for certainty,
because the present uncertainty is not counterbalanced by any of
the merits of flexibility.
Id. at 173.
87. 208 Pa. Super. 230, 222 A.2d 423 (1966).
88. Id. at 237, 222 A.2d at 427.
89. Id. at 236, 222 A.2d at 426.
90. 204 Pa. Super. 99, 203 A.2d 238 (1964).
was lifting a spare tire out of the trunk of a car, he felt a snap
in his back. His injury required the removal of a lumbar disc.
The court found that claimant had not sustained a compensable
accident in that he was doing his regular work and further that
he could not recover under the unusual pathological result doc-
trine because there was evidence of an earlier back operation
(though there was no proof of causal connection between the ear-
lier operation and the injury)."
Because the injury is more subtle, heart attack cases have
pushed the courts' reliance on the accident criterion to the ex-
treme. In Witt v. Witt's Food Market92 the claimant was em-
ployed as a meat cutter and clerk whose duties included handling
quarters of beef and carrying them from the cooler to the chop-
ping block. On the afternoon of the accident he found a 125 pound
quarter of beef on the floor of the cooler. As he picked it up to
put it on a hook he felt a pain in his shoulder and became nau-
seous.9 3 A healthy man before the accident, the claimant was re-
stricted to light work thereafter. The superior court held:
Strain by lifting, as in the instant case, causing en-
largement and discompensation of the heart, or aggra-
vating a preexisting heart condition, is an accident and
compensable if it caused claimant's disability. We are of
the opinion that the evidence warrants the finding that
claimant suffered an accident, and that the accident caused
his existing disability.
94
Thirty years after the Witt decision, McGowan v. Upper Darby
Pet Supply9 5 arose on almost identical facts. Claimant was em-
ployed as a meat cutter and general handyman whose duties in-
cluded handling slabs of horsemeat which ordinarily hung on
hooks. The slabs weighed from 100 to 125 pounds. While picking
up a slab which had fallen to the floor to rehook it, claimant suf-
fered a heart attack. A healthy man before the accident, claimant
petitioned for five months total disability and for partial disabil-
ity thereafter.96 The court refused to grant compensation stating:
The doing of an occasional act involving sustained
muscular effort may be part of the usual duties of a work-
man and, though the work is hard, if it is the same kind
and quantity and done in the same manner as it has been
performed in the past, disability resulting from the ex-
ertion does not constitute an accident.
9 7
Despite the cramping presence of the accident criterion, the
Pennsylvania compensation cases are not without their moments
91. Id. at 101, 203 A.2d at 239-40.
92. 122 Pa. Super. 557, 186 A. 275 (1936).
93. Id. at 563, 186 A. at 277.
94. Id.
95. 207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d 846 (1966).
96. Id. at 330, 217 A.2d at 847.
97. Id. at 332, 217 A.2d at 848. (Witt is not distinguished in the Mc-
Gowan opinion and it is not cited in claimant's brief).
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of brilliance. One such instance occurred in Judge Hoffman's dis-
sent in Hamilton v. Procon8 which was reflected in Justice Jones'
majority opinion for the Supreme Court in the same case.9 9 In
that opinion Justice Jones recommended legislative action to re-
lieve the courts of the accident criterion.10 It was apparent that
despite the craftiest judicial construction, the word "accident"
could not be made to work as the differential factor between most
compensable and non-compensable injuries10 ' and that further in-
dulgence in the semantics of defining and redefining it would only
plunge Pennsylvania further into the "Serbonian bog.'
0 2
Ill. THE PENNSYLVANIA SOLUTIONS: PROCEDURAL REFORM AND
ELIMINATION OF THE ACCIDENT CRITERION
A. Procedural Reform
The Pennsylvania legislative measures intended to solve the
problems discussed above were enacted in two groups of amend-
ments. 0 3 The procedural legislation set the stage for the sub-
stantive amendments which followed. From a procedural point of
view the entire workmen's compensation concept has been reno-
vated. On February 2, 1972 the Secretary of Labor and Industry
received the power to do something about the "bureaucratic, ad-
ministrative mess" as he described the workmen's compensation
system. 10 4 The legislation passed represents the structural steel of
the modern compensation program.
A new section 401.1 gives the Secretary the power to enforce
performance standards:
The department [of Labor and Industry] shall, in ful-
fillment of its responsibility under this act, enforce the
time and other performance standards herein provided
98. 211 Pa. Super. 446, 236 A.2d 819 (1967).
99. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969). On
January 1, 1972 Justice Jones became the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
100. Id. at 100, 252 A.2d at 606.
101. See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 460, 236 A.2d 819,
826 (1967).
The profuse litigation revolving around the accident concept has not
only built up a retaining wall against liability in heart cases by a
distortion of the language of the Act in light of its derviation and
legislative purpose, but has also provided a great source of difficulty
in defining a workable rule.
Id.
102. See note 49 supra.
103. 2 PA. BULL. 245 (Feb. 19, 1972); S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972)
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
104. See TESTIMONY OF THE SEcRETARY note 11 supra.
for the prompt processing of injury cases and payment of
compensation when due by employers and insurers both
upon petition by a party or on its own motion.10
Further and more extensive authorization for the department to
enter the system on its own motion is found in the new section
435:
(a) The department shall establish and promulgate
rules and regulations consistent with this act, which are
reasonably calculated to:
(i) expedite the reporting and processing of in-
jury cases,
(ii) assure full payment of compensation when
due,
(iii) expedite the hearing and determination of
claims .. .,
(iv) provide the disabled employe or his depend-
ents with timely notice,
(v) explain and enforce the provisions of this
act.
10 6
Section 435 authorizes the Secretary to conduct a hearing in the
event of an employer's noncompliance to determine the facts be-
hind the failure to comply. Subject to as yet unpublished rules of
procedure,10 7 the Secretary's hearing will provide the basis for the
imposition of a 10% fine on the employer or, in cases of excessive
delays, a 20% fine on the amount awarded payable to the disabled
employe.10 8 The penalty money is not considered payment of
compensation and in this procedure the new Pennsylvania law
complies with the provisions of the Council of State Government's
Model Workmen's Compensation Statute of 1965.100 The American
Association of State Compensation Funds has commented that un-
necessary delays are properly penalized by civil penalty, but that
the payment of that penalty to the employe is "psychologically
wrong" in that it "generates antagonisms, avarice, animosity and
needless litigation."' 10
Section 436 authorizes the Secretary and any referee or board
member to subpoena witnesses and require the production of rec-
ords.1 ' Any witness who fails to appear under subpoena or who
refuses to be sworn may be held in contempt of the Common
Pleas Court upon application to that court for such a purpose."
2
Section 437 authorizes the Secretary and any employe of the de-
105. 2 PA. BULL. 244 (Feb. 19, 1972).
106. Id. at 249.
107. 2 PA. BULL. 435 (Mar. 11, 1972).
108. 2 PA. BULL. 249 (Feb. 19, 1972).
109. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION LAW, 48 n.8 (1965).
110. Id.




partment, inspector, board member or referee to investigate any
aspect of a claim in the system if the Secretary deems it nec-
essary.1 13 Although the new amendments avoid the use of the
phrase "in the discretion of the Secretary" in reference to the
Secretary's power, the authorization he has under the enactments
amount to a grant of the right to investigate in his good discre-
tion. This power is approved under the Model Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.'
1 4
The major emphasis of the new law is on the Secretary's
power to intervene in the interest of timely payment of claims:
In any case in which compensation has not been timely
paid, or in which notice of denial of compensation has
been given, the department shall hear and determine all
claim petitions for compensation filed by employes or their
dependents. 115
Essentially this new section 401.1 is a check to see that there has
been fair bargaining, but it does suggest a slight reallignment
toward the direct payment system. 1 6 Though the agreement be-
tween the employer and his employe remains the heart of the
Pennsylvania system, the recent enactments appear to be a "pace-
maker:"
The employer and the insurer shall promptly inves-
tigate each injury reported or known to the employer and
shall proceed promptly to commence the payment of com-
pensation due either pursuant to an agreement upon the
compensation payable or a notice of compensation pay-
able .... The first installment of compensation shall be
paid not later than the twenty-first day after the employer
has notice or knowledge of the employe's disability." 7
The notice of compensation payable is used primarily in situations
where it is agreed that some compensation is payable but where
there has been no final agreement as to how much,"" and it
further serves to identify the employer's payments as compen-
tion installments." 9 If the employer controverts payment from
the beginning, then as under the old system, the employe may ini-
tiate hearing proceedings by filing a claim petition.120 Under the
113. Id.
114. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION LAW, 51, § 33 (1965).
115. 2 PA. BULL. 244 (Feb. 19, 1972).
116. See MALONE AND PLANT, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 461 (1963).
117. 2 PA. BULL. 245 (Feb. 19, 1972).
118. Id. § 407 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 731 (1952).
119. 2 PA. BULL. 245 (Feb. 19, 1972).
120. Id.
new amendments, even if the employe does not file for compen-
sation, the department may file in his behalf if upon review of the
employer's notice of compensation denial it appears that there was
a compensable injury.
121
Correlated closely with the major structural change in the
Compensation Act itself were the amendments in the procedural
package designed to change pertinent provisions in the Adminis-
trative Code of 1929122 and the Civil Service Act of 1941.123 These
amendments sparked most of the controversy over the proposed
changes. They took the referees' positions out of the political
patronage circle and put the positions into the civil service sys-
tem. The change was made so that the referees now in office will
have the opportunity to qualify for their jobs,'2 4 but future ap-
pointments will come from inside the civil service system. The
theory behind the enactments was to enable the department and
future claimants to depend upon referees who will be able to spend
fifty-two weeks a year hearing claims, thus eliminating a bottle-
neck of available hearing time at the primary level.
In response to the problem of terminating compensation with-
out notice to the claimants, the Pennsylvania solution is a fair
compromise of a difficult issue. 125 The employer's filing of a peti-
tion to terminate or modify a compensation agreement will act as
a supersedas (stop order) only if the petition alleges that the in-
jured employe has returned to work or that his doctor has certified
a return to full health.126  In other cases the petition will be
treated as a request for supersedas which the referee will investi-
gate and rule on based on the facts of the case.
127
The general rule under the new enactments is that an appeal
by either party will not act as a supersedas. 128 If the employer
petitions the board or the court to which the appeal is directed:
The board or court shall rule upon the petition for a
supersedas as soon as possible and shall consider whether
failure to pay or continue to pay compensation immedi-
ately may jeopardize the health or well being of the em-
ploye and/or his dependents and any other facts which
the board or court deems relevant.
129
121. Id. at 244.
122. Id. at 250 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 151, 152, 568, 572,
573 (1962).
123. S.B. 905, 156th Sess. amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.3
(1962).
124. 2 PA. BULL. 251 (Feb. 19, 1972).
125. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, COMMENTARY, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION LAW, 147 (A. Larson, 1965); Berkowitz,
The Processing of Workmen's Compensation Cases, LABOR DEP'T BULL. 310
at 139 (1967).
126. 2 PA. BULL. 246 (Feb. 19, 1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 774 (1952).
127. Id.





The Council of State Governments has taken the opposite position
on the application of supersedas to appeals reasoning, perhaps,
that the assumed operation of supersedas will discourage spurious
employe appeals.130 The Pennsylvania presumption that super-
sedas will not apply appears closer to the humanitarian purposes
of the act yet still allows for supersedas to apply where the em-
ployer can demonstrate that the employe and his dependents no
longer require the compensation.' 3' The new enactments provide
for the creation of a credit fund from which the employer can re-
cover his payments if a later judicial finding rules that they were
not owed to the claimant.
132
The new amendments extend the statute of limitations on em-
ployee claim petitions from sixteen months to two years'3 but fail
to take into consideration a latent injury in all but radiation
cases.13 4 The statute of limitations runs from the date of the in-
jury, not from the date of discovery. 13 5 The model act developed
by the Council of State Governments reduces the statute of lim-
itations to one year either from the date of injury or from the
date that the employe in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known of his injury and its possible relationship to his em-
ployment.130 A logical next step in Pennsylvania compensation
would be to adopt the model compensation code's position on the
flexible statute of limitations with regard to all injuries. The pur-
pose of the statute is to compensate the disabled employe for his
work related injuries, not to defeat his meritorious claim with
technicalities.13
7
The amendments of March 1972 have extended the substantive
side of the act by updating compensation schedules and broaden-
ing the act's coverage formula. They have lifted the $60.00 ceiling
on maximum compensation payable per week and have pegged the
new ceiling at 66 2/3% of the statewide average weekly wage as
130. See note 125 supra.
131. See, Zimmer v. Closky, 122 Pa. Super. 142, 145, 186 A. 403, 404
(1936) (employers and insurance carriers should not be encouraged to play
fast and loose with an injured employe).
132. 2 PA. BULL. 250 (Feb. 19, 1972). The reimbursement fund is
maintained by annual assessments from the employers' insurers. Id.
133. 2 PA. BULL. 244 (Feb. 19, 1972), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 602 (Supp. 1971).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. COUNCn OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION LAW 47 (1965).
137. See Williams v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 174 Pa. Super. 47, 52,
98 A.2d 236 (1953).
computed fiscally by the state's Unemployment Compensation
Bureau.138 This means that the employe who works for the aver-
age wage will receive a full 66 2/3% of his wage should he qualify
for it and he will no longer be losing over $27.00 per week as he
did under the static $60.00 maximum. 3 9
The legislature also deleted the twelve month limitation on
reasonable medical and surgical expenses necessitated by the work-
related injury. 140  Amendments to Section 306 of the act greatly
extended, in some cases almost doubled, the existing schedule pe-
riods under permanent partial injury provisions.' 4 ' Though there
is no mention of rehabilitation in the new amendment, the Section
306.2 Subsequent Injury Fund has been enlarged and should have
a positive effect on the hiring of the handicapped. 142 The Subse-
quent Injury Fund protects the second employer who gives the
partially disabled employe a job, knowing that if the employe is
injured again he may be totally disabled. The fund pays the dif-
ference between the second employer's compensation for his work
contributed injury and the total disability which has followed the
normally partially disabling accident. Thus the employer who
knows that he will not be expected to bear the cumulative weight
of both injuries in terms of compensation will not be as reluctant
to hire the handicapped.
1 43
B. Elimination of the Accident Criterion
In terms of broadening the scope of compensability under the
act, the most significant substantive change was to Section 301.
The word "accident" in subsection 301 (a) was replaced by the
word "injury.'1 44 Though this substitution was made in over forty
instances within the act, this particular one is imperative to the
changing of the judicial construction of the injury coverage for-
mula because the initial sentence in Section 301 has been the cor-
nerstone of the accident requirement. 1 45  The courts, in looking to
138. S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972) § 306 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 512 (Supp. 1971).
139. See note 53 supra.
140. S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972) § 306 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 531 (Supp. 1971).
141. Id. § 513 (Schedule period refers to a pre-set number of weeks
during which an employe who loses a certain body member receives com-
pensation regardless of his actual wage loss. Some examples of the recent
increases in schedule periods indicate the legislature's intent to make signifi-
cant improvement: for the loss or loss of use of a hand, the number of
compensable weeks was extended from 175 weeks to 335 weeks; for an
arm, 215 weeks to 410 weeks; for an eye, 150 weeks to 275 weeks; for a
forearm, 195 weeks to 370 weeks. See generally S.B. 1048, 156th Sess.
(1972) § 306 (c) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 513 (Supp. 1971).
142. S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972) § 306.2.
143. See Leonard, Legal Roadblocks to Rehabilitation, 1963 ABA Pso-
CEEDINrs, Section of Ins., Negligence and Compensation Law 229 (1963).
144. S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972) § 301 amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 431 (Supp. 1971).
145. See, e.g., Good v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Property and Supplies,
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their familiar touchstone, cannot fail to note the new legislative
mandate. The legislature, in subsection (c) of the same section, re-
defined "injury" for the renewed purposes of the act. Changed
from the old narrow definition of "only violence to the physical
structure of the body," the new amendments provide that "injury"
and "personal injury" shall be construed to mean:
[A] n injury to an employe, regardless of his previous
physical condition, arising in the course of his employment
and related thereto, and such disease or infection as nat-
urally results from the injury or is aggravated, reacti-
vated or accelerated by the injury.
46
If there is sufficient work relation, the employe's injury is com-
pensable under the act regardless of his previous physical condi-
tion. "Regardless" is a strong word to find in the act, especially
because even in the more liberal jurisdictions the employe's pre-
vious health is held relevant to the causation inquiry.1 47 "Regard-
less" implies that the employe's medical contribution to the injury
is not to be considered along with the causal contribution of the
employment. Such an interpretation pulls the usual stops and
makes the employer an insurer of his employe's health while the
employe is within the course of his employment. Such a reading
is not consistent with what has come to be the standard reading of
the purpose of the Pennsylvania act.148 Even though problems are
bound to arise with such a broad mandate, at least the courts are
now deciding compensability on the workable issue-causation.149
IV. PENNSYLVANIA'S SOLUTIONS IN CONTEXT: PROGRESSIVE
NEIGHBORS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM.
A. Pennsylvania's Legislation in the Context of Recent New Jer-
sey and Michigan Experience
The 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Com-
pensation Act were a transfusion to a system which had begun its
346 Pa. 151, 153-54, 30 A.2d 434, 436 (1943); Lacey v. Washburn and Wil-
liams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 577, 164 A. 724, 725 (1933).
146. S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. (1972) amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 411 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
147. Compare Greene v. International Indus. Contract Corp., 18 Mich.
App. 193, 171 N.W.2d 44, 47 (1969) with Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36
N.J. 487, 488, 178 A.2d 161, 163 (1962).
148. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 97, 252 A.2d 601, 604
(1969); State Workmen's Ins. Fund v. Young, 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 423, 428, 276
A.2d 552, 556 (1971); Rettew v. Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. 564, 568, 165 A.2d
424, 426 (1960). See also note 101 and accompanying text supra.
149. See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 96-97, 252 A.2d 601,
604 (1969); Larson, The 'Heart Cases' in Workmen's Compensation: An
Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 MxhcH. L. REv. 441 (1967).
decline. The legislation may prove timely enough to affect the
verdict of the National Commission when it reports its findings
and recommendations to the President. 150 The legislature accom-
plished in its 156th session the kind of responsible reform nec-
essary to avert complete federalization of workmen's compensa-
tion."' Though the reforms do not take the practical agreement
factor out of the private sector as the direct payment systems do,
15 2
they indicate that the Department of Labor and Industry has the
power to investigate dilatory payment of compensation and to
reprimand those employers who do not follow the law. 153 The em-
ployers must begin payment within three weeks of the disability
or inform the Department why they have not.15 4  This feature,
characteristic of direct payment plans, is designed to get the agree-
ment process moving.
The immediate effects of the changes like the period extension
in the schedule benefits and the ceiling increase in the maximum
compensation payable were enough to give Pennsylvania a new
profile against the standards set up by such groups as the Inter-
150. See The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 676(d)
(2) (Supp. 1971) (The Nat'l Comm. on State Workmen's Compensation Law
files its statement of findings and recommendations with Congress and
the President no later than July 31, 1972).
151. See Dahl, Workmen's Compensation in the Seventies, 1970 ABA
PROCEEDINGS, Section of Ins., Negligence and Compensation Law 129, 133
(1970) (Commissioner Dahl delineates the ISIABC comprehensive list of
standards for workmen's compensation laws: (1) compulsory law; (2) no
numerical exceptions; (3) no specific exemptions of hazardous employment;
(4) coverage for all injuries; (5) coverage for all occupational diseases;
(6) full medical care for all injuries; (7) full medical care for all occupa-
tional diseases; (8) permanent total disability compensation for life; (9)
claims administration supervised by an agency; (10) adequate time for
filing for injuries; (11) adequate time limit for filing for occupational
diseases. He lists as high priority secondary goals: (1) judicial review
limited to questions of law; (2) payment to the widow until death or re-
marriage; (3) payment to children during minority; (4) compensation at
the rate of 66 2/3% of the worker's wage up to the average weekly wage in
the jurisdiction); O'Brien, More Injuries Less Compensation, Reprinted
from AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST (Feb. 1970) (The author lists the
twenty-one standards recommended by AFL-CIO which in addition to the
above include: reciprocity of benefit rights between jurisdictions; full com-
pensation protection under second injury funds; choice of qualified physi-
cian by injured workers; maintenance benefits during rehabilitation; in-
clusion of a rehabilitation division within the workmen's compensation
agency; double benefits for injured minors employed in violation of state
law; prohibition of lump-sum settlements and compromise of rights to full
medical care unless approved on the advice of rehabilitation agency; and
prohibition of special contracts where a worker with a specific physical
defect waives his right to compensation); but see Page and Sellers, Occu-
pational Safety and Health: Environmental Justice for the Forgotten
American, 59 Ky. L. REv. 114, 140 (1970) (Authors frame "A Workers' Bill
of Health Rights").
152. See, e.g., The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33
U.S.C.A. § 914 (1970) (Section 914 exemplifies the operation of the direct
payment system).
153. 2 PA. BULL. 249 (Feb. 19, 1972).
154. Id. at 245.
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national Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commis-
sions.
155
The effect of the deletion of the accident requirement remains
conjectural. Dean Larson wrote:
Of course, legislation is only part of the process of
amelioration. Judicial decision contributes a large part
toward helping the acts carry out their real purpose with
increasing effectiveness.
15
The Pennsylvania courts are not without precedent with which to
buttress decisions under the new law: the statute codifies the re-
sult obtained by the state's judiciary under the unusual pathologi-
cal result doctrine but deletes the condition that the injured em-
ploye must have been previously healthy.15 7 In his predictive dis-
sent in Hamilton v. Procon, Inc.158 Judge Hoffman of the superior
court wrote:
The major purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act in this state . . . is to have private employers bear
the burden of work connected injury of employees, rather
than to have that burden fall on individual workers, on
public welfare, or on private charity.
Thus, the Commonwealth's primary concern is that
an employee should be paid benefits for any injuries which
are unforeseen or unexpected and are suffered in the
course of his employment. This should mean an injury
is compensable whether or not the employee had a pre-
existing disease as long as the result was precipitated or
aggravated by any work related task. Only by such an
interpretation can we begin to effectuate the purpose of
the act enunciated above.' 5 9
The problem becomes one of causation. °60 If the employer is to re-
main liable only for those injuries which are work-related, the
burden must still be on the employe to show that his injury was
caused by the employment.' 6' Will medical causation be enough
155. See note 151 supra.
156. Larson, Forward, Workmen's Compensation in Ohio, 19 OMo ST.
L.J. 537, 539-40 (1950).
157. See, e.g., Wance v. Gettig Eng'r and Mfg. Co., 204 Pa. Super. 297,
204 A.2d 492 (1964); Gammaitoni v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 185 Pa. Super.
643, 139 A.2d 679 (1958). Other jurisdictions, arriving at the same result,
approached the problem through the unusual pathological result doctrine.
See, e.g., Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141
A.2d 761 (1958); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d
614 (1957).
158. 211 Pa. Super. 446, 236 A.2d 819 (1967).
159. Id. at 462-63, 236 A.2d at 826.
160. See note 149 supra.
161. See, e.g., McFarlane v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 205 Pa. Super. 66, 69,
or will the courts develop a legal standard of causation under
which the claimant must submit his case? The act does not an-
swer these questions. The courts will likely look for the answers
in Pennsylvania's "unusual pathological result" precedents and also
in neighboring states' decisions. Federal court decisions under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act' 62 may also provide
some background for Pennsylvania courts as they wrestle with the
amended act. A short summary of the causation tests required
by the courts of New Jersey and Michigan in heart attack cases
and by the federal courts in their compensation cases may provide
insight into the likely standard which Pennsylvania courts will
apply to determine causation inquiries.
The statutory provision governing the compensability of work
accidents in New Jersey' 63 reads much like the old section 301(a)1
64
in Pennsylvania's Act. It requires compensation for "personal in-
juries to, or for the death of, such employe by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment.'1 65 In 1958, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court attacked the "by accident" requirement head-
on in Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co. 16 The court
held that the widow of a millwright did not have to prove as a con-
dition of compensability that her husband's heart attack occurred
as the result of an unusual exertion. This decision overruled forty-
seven years of precedent and evinced an innovative role that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was unwilling to assume.16 7 The re-
sult is that in New Jersey by judicial decree and in Pennsylvania
by legislative mandate the issue of compensability now centers on
causation.
The New Jersey legal test for causation, founded upon the
English compensation heritage shared by both New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, was enunciated in Ciuba:
[T] he issue, after all, as in other civil cases, is whether
the [claimant's] burden of proof has been sustained.
'Reasonable probability' is the standard of persuasion, that
is to say, evidence in quality sufficient to generate belief
that the tendered hypothesis is in all human likelihood
the fact . . . . It need not have the attribute of certainty,
but it must be a presumption well founded in reason and
logic; mere guess or conjecture is not a substitute for
legal proof. The determinative inquiry is whether the evi-
dence demonstrates the offered hypothesis as a rational
208 A.2d 40, 42 (1965); Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202 Pa.
Super. 616, 624, 198 A.2d 399, 403 (1964).
162. 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (1970).
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959).
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Supp. 1971).
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959).
166. 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).




inference .... The accepted standard of persuasion is
that the determination be probably based on truth.168
Applied to the facts of the case, the court held:
[T] he evidence here sustains as reasonably probable
the hypothesis of a service-induced injury. The requisite
causal relationship is brought within the bounds of ra-
tional inference. 6 9
This test was reasserted and amplified by Justice Francis in
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co. 1'70 where he rejected the insertion of a
relative exertion standard into New Jersey's causation test:
Compensability arises whenever the required exertion
is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever
the degree of exertion or condition of his heart.
Benefits are not lost because the amount of the work
stress was such that it might or could be duplicated in
routine activity about the home or in customary move-
ments or effort while there. Nor is compensation to be
denied because of proof that even if the accident had not
happened the workman would have become totally dis-
abled or would have died within a relatively short time
by reason of the progress of his disease.
171
The court defined the claimant's legal burden:
Such claimant has the burden of showing by the pre-
ponderance of the believable evidence that the ordinary
work effort or strain in reasonable probability contributed
in some material degree to the precipitation, aggravation
or acceleration of the existing heart disease and the death
therefrom.'
The claimant's mere assertion of a reasonably probable con-
tributory work connection is not enough unless supported by ex-
pert medical testimony. 173 The Dwyer court was faced with two
medical experts who disagreed on the medical cause of claimant's
fatal heart attack. Claimant's physician testified that the cumula-
tive effect of his work effort increased the extent of claimant's
coronary insufficiency so as to be a major contributing factor in
the acute myocardial infarction. The respondent's doctor asserted
that for any causal connection to exist between work effort and
heart attack, there must be a stress or strain incident just prior to
the onset of his initial symptom. Faced with a contradiction in
168. 27 N.J. 127, 139, 141 A.2d 761, 767 (1958).
169. Id. at 140, 141 A.2d at 768.
170. 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962).
171. 36 N.J. 491-92, 178 A.2d 163 (1962).
172. Id. at 493, 178 A.2d at 164.
173. Id. at 495, 178 A.2d at 165.
medical causation, the court's decision on legal causation is deter-
mined by the more reasonable of the two medical theories accord-
ing to the common experiences of mankind.1'7 4 The court's holding
in Dwyer vividly describes the decision-making process under the
New Jersey test:
Consideration of the entire factual framework in
which this decedent's fatal heart attack has been pre-
sented stimulates in us a strong feeling of probability
that the succession of employment strains described-as
distinguished from a single incident immediately followed
by pain or other symptoms-participated in a material
way in the acceleration of the attack. We are convinced
that the series of exertions so acted on the seriously dis-
eased heart as to join with it to an appreciable extent
in hastening the fatal attack.
75
The relationship between the medical testimony and the determi-
nation of legal cause is further illustrated in Justice Francis' closing
remarks in Dwyer:
The ultimate judicial decision in a specific case, then,
must be reached through an evaluation of the conflicting
opinions in the light of the facts surrounding the work
effort which are relied on by the witnesses as the basis
for their views. The delicate nature of that task is the
reason why the law must underline so heavily the de-
mand that the medical experts describe the operative fac-
tors which have lead to their conclusions.'
7 6
In Schiffres v. Kittatinny Lodge, Inc.,' 77 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that where petitioner's evidence was not explicit
and detailed as to the causal connection between his heart attack
and his employment he failed to carry his burden of proof. 178
Petitioner's doctors had testified that to hold the fatal infarction
causally connected to his earlier work-related attack, it was suf-
ficient to know that the earlier one had occurred. The court held
that this testimony was inadequate and denied petitioner's claim.
The supreme court in Aladits v. Simmons Co.' 79 awarded compen-
174. See, Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127,
141 A.2d 761, 768 (1958).
175. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 515, 178 A.2d 161, 172 (1962).
176. Id. at 519, 178 A.2d at 174.
177. 39 N.J. 139, 188 A.2d 1 (1963).
178. Id. at 154, 188 A.2d at 9.
179. 47 N.J. 115, 219 A.2d 517 (1966). Judge Francis outlined the five
points crucial to knowledgeable appellate court inquiry:
In order to evaluate fairly a medical expert's opinion that a
heart attack was caused or contributed to by the employment
within the Dwyer principle, a court should have answers to (1)
why the work strain or effort caused or contributed to the attack,
(2) how it caused or contributed, (3) what were the physiological
mechanics which followed in the wake of the strain or effort which
demonstrate that the attack was probably related to the strain or
effort, (4) what went on within the employee if the strain or effort
precipitated or contributed materially to the attack, (5) what, if
any, signs or symptoms might be expected to accompany the heart
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sation to the family of a previously healthy laborer and delineated
a five-point test for claimants to satisfy with their proofs of causa-
tion. In Kaplowiz v. K & R Appliances, Inc.,80 the New Jersey
Superior Court held that the petitioner's proof of causation was in-
adequate for the reasons indicated in Schiffres,i 1' and further,
that petitioner bore the additional burden on appeal to show that
the county court's findings were unreasonable. 182 The court's will-
ingness to balance the credibilities was again shown in Meines v.
Levine Associates,'8 3 where the supreme court sustained an award
to the widow of a carpenter whose proof rested largely on her
physician's conjecture that the deceased took a nitroglycerin pill
at lunch time because he was in pain rather than as a prophylac-
tic.' 84 Respondent's doctor testified that the same type of pill is
prescribed prophylactically so that decedent may have taken the
pill preventatively as well as for pain symptoms. Adopting claim-
ant's physician's testimony, the court reasoned that the decedent
was in pain when he returned to work after lunch and that his
exertion in nailing studs for two hours thereafter aggravated his
episode.18 5 Citing Dwyer'8 6 with approval, the court held that
"on the whole record the preponderance of the probabilities sup-
ports the justice "of a compensation award."'1 87 In New Jersey,
then, the legal test is ultimately resolved by the preponderance of
the probabilities based on sufficient, detailed, analytical, credible
evidence.
In Michigan, the legislature deleted the word "accident" from
their compensation act in all but five places.188 Nine years later
in Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co.,'8 9 the Michigan Supreme
Court asserted that the accident criterion still had to be met.
Claimants had to meet the unusual exertion test, etc., just as in
Pennsylvania, until 1957 when in great judicial controversy the re-
quirement was read back out of Michigan Workmen's Compensa-
attack or appear immediately thereafter which a layman might ob-
serve, or which a doctor might observe or regard as significant, etc.
Id. at 128, 219 A.2d 522-23 (1966).
180. 108 N.J. Super. 54, 259 A.2d 922 (1969).
181. Schiffres v. Kittatinny Lodge, Inc., 39 N.J. 139, 188 A.2d 1, 9 (1963).
182. Kaplowitz v. K & R Appliances, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 54, 59,
259 A.2d 922, 927 (1969).
183. 58 N.J. 548, 279 A.2d 654 (1971),
184. Id. at 553, 279 A.2d at 656.
185. Id. at 554, 279 A.2d at 657.
186. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962).
187. Meines v. Levine Associates, 58 N.J. 548, 556, 279 A.2d 654, 659
(1971).
188. MICH. PUB. ACTS 1943, No. 245.
189. 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952).
tion.19 0 In Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank,1 9' the supreme
court announced the end of the exertion doctrine in language
later reaffirmed in Zaremba v. Chrysler Corp.: 1
92
[A]n accidental injury arises . . . when the required
exertion producing the injury is too great for the person
undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or
the condition of his health, provided the exertion is either
the sole or a contributing cause of the injury. In short,
[we hold] that an injury is accidental when either the
cause or the result is unexpected or accidental, although
the work being done is usual or ordinary.
193
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Greene v. International Indus-
trial Contract Corp.194 held that in the Sheppard'9 ' test there re-
mains a role that the claimant's pre-existing health must play:
Sheppard therefore stands for the proposition that pre-
existing health is immaterial where prior determination
discloses that an injury in fact exists and that the injury
is causally connected with the employment. In the in-
stant case, since the causal connection of the death to
the employment is in question, evidence of the preexisting
health of the decedent is material to the cause of death
and properly could be considered in ascertaining whether
a causal relation existed under the Zaremba test.1916
The Michigan test under the Greene197 interpretation of Shep-
pard""s resembles the traditional tort test of causation, weighing
the contributing roles of each participating factor. To recover in
Michigan, the claimant must demonstrate a higher level of employ-
ment contribution to a particular injury than he would have to
show in New Jersey.
B. Causation Under the Longshoremen's Act
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,199 it is
provided that in the hearing for the enforcement of a claim "it
shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary" that the compensatory provisions apply.20 0 The claim-
ant has a presumption in his favor which his employer must rebut.
190. See Larson, The 'Heart Cases' in Workmen's Comvensation: An
Analysis and Suggested Solution. 65 MicH. L. REv. 441, 449-50 (1967).
191. 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
192. 377 Mich. 226. 139 N.W.2d 745 (1966).
193. Id. Pt 226, 139 N.W.2d at 748.
194. 18 Mich. App. 193. 171 N.W.2d 44.
195. Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614
(1957).
196. Greene v. International Indus. Contract Corp., 18 Mich. App. 193,
198, 171 N.W.2d 44, 47 (1969).
197. Id.
198. Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614
(1957).
199. 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (1970).
200. Id. at § 920(a).
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In Wheatly v. Adler,20 1 the widow of a garage mechanic recovered
compensation when her husband sustained a heart attack caused
by myocardial insufficiency and advanced arteriosclerosis while he
was outside on the employer's lawn having relieved himself prior
to the beginning of his first job. The court found that the de-
ceased was within the course of his employment because he had
changed into his work clothes and had been given his first assign-
ment by his foreman. Petitioner's physician testified that urinat-
ing in the cold forty degree February weather could have some
precipatory effect on a heart seizure while respondent's expert in-
dicated that the absence of any significant exertion prior to the at-
tack made him feel that the heart episode was not caused by the
employment. 20 2 The court held that the absence of unusual strain
and the presence of arteriosclerosis had no effect on the claimant's
petition. The possibility that Wheatley's death might have been
caused by urinating in the cold combined with the presumption of
compensability to justify an award of compensation. Respondent's
medical testimony was held to be insufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption.
203
The Supreme Court in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon2 4 de-
fined the role of causation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act:
The test of recovery is not a causal relation between
the nature of the employment of the injured person and
the accident .... All that is required is that the "obli-
gations or conditions" of employment create a "zone of
special danger" out of which the injury arose. 20 5
Repudiating causation as the foundation of compensability, the
O'Leary0 0 decision substituted a broad standard of positional
risk.20 7 Wolff v. Britton,20 8 which denied compensation to the vic-
tim of an injury sustained during an idiopathic seizure which oc-
curred at work was decided under the O'Leary doctrine by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The case demonstrates the
difficulty inherent in basing a decision on so vague a test:
Whether or not a seizure produces a compensable in-
jury for a newly hired employee . . . would seem to turn
201. 407 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
202. Id. at 313.
203. Id. at 313-14.
204. 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
205. Id. at 507.
206. Id. at 504.
207. Id. at 507 ("Zone of special danger.")
208. 328 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
on his having encountered some occupational hazard, or
at least the injury must have been related to his work.
209
The court continued, denying that its decision rested on the lack of
causal relationship between the employment and the injury,
210
finally holding that the Deputy Commissioner's inference was sup-
ported by the record that the decedent's injury did not arise out of
his employment. 211 Wolff v. Britton21 2 draws the line at the idio-
pathic fall and holds that there must be more work relation than
mere presence at the work site. Of the three jurisdictions dis-
cussed, the federal courts under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act 21 3 offer the most inclusive injury coverage formula.
Aided by the presumption of compensability, the injured employe
need only show some work relation in order to recover and any
doubts arising from the proofs are to be resolved in favor of the
employe or his dependent family.
21 4
V. CONCLUSION
The broad humanitarian purposes of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act were being frustrated in Pennsylvania. Workmen dis-
covered after their injury that they were not covered by the Act
when they could not show a mishap or a trauma or freedom from
a pre-existing bodily defect. Under the agreement system the dis-
abled employe settled his claim in most cases with his employer's
insurer and had no recourse to the Department of Labor and In-
dustry short of litigation even when the agreement was obviously
onesided. If the worker was totally disabled and the insurer did
not controvert, the maximum any worker would be compensated
was $60.00 per week, a sum significantly below the poverty index.
215
The Department of Labor and Industry was virtually powerless
to remedy the delayed payments problem. The Department did
not have the statutory power to reprimand dilatory insurers nor
did it have the mandate to investigate on its own motion. The
operative bodies within the Department, the Workmen's Compen-
sation Board and its referees faced a contested case backlog which
the Secretary of Labor and Industry described as deplorable.
The legislation of the first quarter of 1972 has squarely faced
many of the problem areas and has reestablished Pennsylvania as
a leader in progressive workmen's compensation. Preserving the
ideals of the agreement program, the legislature has allowed it to
209. Id. at 184.
210. Id. at 185.
211. Id.
212. 328 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
213. 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (1970).
214. Id. at 4 920.
215. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1971 at 321 (92d ed. 1971) (The average poverty level for
all non-farm families in 1969 was $3,410 or $65.58 weekly).
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remain the foundation of the system but it is now under much
closer administrative scrutiny from the Department of Labor and
Industry. The procedural changes, such as the Secretary's power
to conduct hearings and the referees' reclassification as civil ser-
vants indicate an impatience with the delays of the old system and
a mandate for speedy efficiency in the new. The Secretary has the
power to recommend to the Insurance Commissioner that a dila-
tory insurance company's license be revoked and to investigate
complaints from injury victims on its own motion. The insurer is
charged with paying the compensation due within twenty-one days
after the employer has knowledge of the injury or, in the alterna-
tive, notifying the Department of Labor and Industry of the rea-
sons for controversy. No petition to modify an award or notice of
appeal will act automatically as a supersedas and compensation
will continue to be paid to the disabled employe.
Adjusting the maximum compensation ceiling from $60.00 per
week to two-thirds of the last fiscal year's statewide average week-
ly wage was an important legislative step toward making work-
men's compensation a program which can function independently
and not require federal subsidy.2 16 The abolition of the one year
time limit on the employer's liability for medical expenses means
that the totally disabled worker will be able to obtain reasonable
medical services to alleviate his injury even though he could not
justify the treatment from an employment standpoint. The re-
organized Subsequent Injury Fund makes the employment of dis-
abled workers more attractive to prospective employers and in so
doing aids in the employe's complete rehabilitation.
The courts have been given a wide open door with respect to
the scope of compensability by the legislative redrafting of Sec-
tion 301217 of the Act. The elimination of the accident criterion
and the addition of the phrase "regardless of his previous physi-
cal condition" are major changes toward an expanded injury cov-
erage formula. Awards for all disabled workmen now should fall
into line with those heretofore compensated under the courts' un-
usual pathological result doctrine. Projecting the role of causa-
tion in future Pennsylvania decisions, it is suggested that the
causation inquiry will align itself with the New Jersey tests, per-
haps on the conservative Michigan side rather than toward the
broad federal precedents under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act. The most important result is that Pennsylvania
216. See Social Security Amendments Act of 1970, H.R. 17550.
217. See S.B. 1048, 156th Sess. amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 431,
411 (Supp. 1971).
claimants will no longer be frustrated by requirements of pre-
vious good health or unusual exertion. Workmen's compensation
now has a chance to become what its founders originally intended
it to be-a humanitarian act to compensate employes for work-
related injuries by making the cost of compensation fall on the
employer and not directly on the individual employe or the public.
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